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THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ v. BEATY
JENNIFER PRICE*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Republic of Iraq v. Beaty,1 the Supreme Court is asked to
determine whether a Presidential waiver has restored Iraqi sovereign
immunity that had been previously removed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). In deciding the case, the
Court must address two questions: first, did the Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act (EWSAA) grant the President
authority to waive 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) and, second, did either the
EWSAA or the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), by
explicitly granting the authority to restore Iraq’s sovereign immunity,
apply to pending cases? In answering these questions, the Court must
also elucidate its approach to statutory interpretation, particularly the
level of deference given to Congressional intent as discerned via
legislative history and Executive interpretations.
II. FACTS
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA),2 revising part of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act (FSIA) by revoking the sovereign immunity of states in
suits for monetary damages based on allegations of state-sponsored
terrorism.3 Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), the AEDPA provided
that a U.S. national could sue an agent of a foreign state for personal

* 2010 J.D./L.L.M. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Republic of Iraq v. Simon, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert granted, 129 S. Ct. 894
(mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (Nos. 08-539 and 07 -1090) (consolidating the case with Republic of
Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 893 (mem.)).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1242–43 (1996).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000) (repealed).
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injury from terrorism-related crimes if the state had been designated
4
as a sponsor of terrorism at the time of the alleged acts.
Shortly after the passage of the AEDPA, and following the first
Gulf War, Kevin Beaty, William Barloon, their wives and other
detainees sued Iraq under § 1605(a)(7) because they had been taken
5
hostage and tortured by the Saddam Hussein regime. After the
plaintiffs won their suit, in early 2003, Beaty’s and Barloon’s children
also filed suit against Iraq for the emotional damage they suffered
during their fathers’ captivity.6 That same year, in a different suit,
Robert Simon filed similar claims against Iraq for having been taken
7
hostage and tortured during the Gulf War.
In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and Congress
passed the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act
(EWSAA).8 A few months later the President declared the §
1605(a)(7) exception to sovereign immunity inapplicable to Iraq per
9
Section 1503 of the EWSAA, enacted during the Gulf War, which
had permitted suspension of certain sanctionor terrorism-related
provisions for Iraq.10 In 2008,11 Congress passed the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), of which Section
1083(a) repealed the § 1605(a)(7) exception and replaced it with a
new exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A expanding individuals’ ability to
12
recover against states that sponsor terrorism. In order to protect the
Iraqi reconstruction effort, however, Congress added Section 1083(d)
to the NDAA,13 which permitted the President to waive the other
4. Id. These offenses included torture and hostage taking if the foreign official was acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency. The plaintiff must have also given
the state a chance to first arbitrate the claim. Id.
5. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20–24 (D.D.C. 2001).
6. Beaty v. Republic of Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2007).
7. Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
8. Pub. L. No. 108-11, at 1, 117 Stat. 559, 559 (2003).
9. Pres. Determ. No. 2003-23, 68 Fed. Reg. 26459 (May 7, 2003).
10. Id. (“The President may suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq Sanctions
Act of 1990 . . . Provided further, That the President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law that applies to
countries that have supported terrorism . . . .” (emphasis added)).
11. After the circuit court decision in Beaty v. Iraq but before the appellate arguments for
Simon v. Iraq.
12. Pub. L. No. 110-181, Section 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338–45 (2008). The NDAA established a
federal cause of action allowing punitive damages and replacing § 1605(a)(7) with a new §
1605A. Section 1083(c)(1) stated that regarding application to pending cases, “The amendments
made by this section shall apply to any claim arising under section 1605A.”
13. Id.
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provisions within Section 1083 with respect to Iraq, including the new
14
§ 1605A exception to sovereign immunity.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the litigation in the cases consolidated before the Court in
Iraq v. Beaty, the courts had developed a general jurisprudence on
how to interpret the retroactive application of various statutes. In
15
Landgraf v. USI Film Products the Supreme Court held that when a
statute affects not simply jurisdiction but also substantive rights,
including a statute that “impairs rights a party possessed when he
acted,” it cannot be read retroactively absent clear Congressional
16
intent. Therefore, when Congress has not plainly defined the scope
of the provision with respect to pending cases the courts must
determine whether it affects only jurisdiction or substantive rights as
well.17
18
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, however, the Supreme Court held that
retroactivity is usually not an issue for statutes that merely confer or
remove jurisdiction because jurisdictional statutes “[take] away no
substantive right but simply [change] the tribunal that is to hear the
case.”19 Therefore, jurisdictional statutes, said the Court, presumably
20
apply to pending cases. But despite this presumption, the Court
relied on the “normal rules of construction, including a contextual
reading of the statutory language”21 and preceding legislative history.22
Where other provisions in the same section of the statute contained
explicit language evidencing Congress’s intent that the statute apply
to cases pending before the statute’s enactment, the Court found the
14. Pres. Determ. No. 2008-9, 73 Fed. Reg. 6571 (Jan. 28, 2008).
15. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
16. See id. at 280 (holding the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not apply to conduct prior to its
enactment).
17. See id. (“When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court
must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or
impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear
congressional intent favoring such a result.”).
18. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Justice Roberts did not participate in this
decision.
19. Id. at 576–77.
20. Id. at 577.
21. Id.
22. Id. at n.10, 580, 584.
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lack of such language in the jurisdiction-stripping provision
23
demonstrated Congress’s intent that it not apply to pending cases.
The Court has previously examined the retroactive application of
24
the FSIA in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, where it held that the
presumption against applying statutes retroactively was merely “a
presumption, rather than a constitutional command.”25 Though there
was no clear Congressional language, the Landgraf analysis proved
unsatisfactory to the Court because the FSIA “defies . . .
categorization” as to whether it affects only jurisdiction or substantive
26
rights. Specifically, the Court noted that prior cases had stated that
the FSIA was a statute that codified foreign sovereign immunity rules
“‘as an aspect of substantive federal law.’”27 The Court went on to
determine that foreign immunity questions “reflect[] current political
realities and relationships” and found it appropriate to follow history
“by deferring to the ‘decisions of the political branches . . . on whether
to take jurisdiction.’”28 Noting that one of Congress’s stated purposes
was “eliminating political participation in the resolution of such
claims,”29 the Court found that Congress intended to apply the statute
30
to conduct occurring before its enactment. The Court’s holding
followed Justice Scalia’s approach in his Landgraf concurrence, and
did not focus on the distinction between jurisdiction and the
impairment of rights but rather on what the “relevant activity that the
rule regulates” was.31
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Altman, the D.C. Circuit
32
decided Acree v. Republic of Iraq, holding that the EWSAA (of
which Section 1503 had permitted suspension of certain sanctionor
terrorism-related provisions for Iraq) did not authorize the President

23. See id. at 582–84 (deciding that the courts continued to have jurisdiction over pending
habeas cases).
24. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
25. Id. at 692–93.
26. Id. at 694.
27. Id. at 695 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496–97
(1983) (emphasis added)).
28. Id. at 696.
29. Id. at 679.
30. Id. at 697.
31. Id. at 698.
32. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
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33
to suspend the former § 1605(a)(7) with regard to Iraq. Reading
Section 1503 of the EWSAA as a whole and in the context of the
entire statute, the court held it did not encompass § 1605(a)(7)
because Section 1503 was “aimed at legal provisions that present
obstacles to assistance and funding for the new Iraqi Government and
was not intended to alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts under
the FSIA.”34 Notably, in terms of predicting the outcome of the
current case before the Supreme Court, current Chief Justice Roberts,
a D.C. Circuit Judge at the time, disagreed with the majority’s holding,
finding instead that Presidential Determination 2003-23 “ousted the
federal courts of jurisdiction in cases that relied on that exception to
Iraq’s sovereign immunity.”35 Then-Judge Roberts’s interpretation was
rooted in his interpretation that “‘[a]ny other provision’ should be
read to mean ‘any other provision,’ not, as the majority would have it,
‘provisions that present obstacles to assistance and funding for the
new Iraqi Government.’”36 He emphasized his view that the EWSAA
represented “the first time [Congress] confronted the prospect that a
friendly successor government would, in its infancy, be vulnerable
under Section 1605(a)(7) to crushing liability for the actions of its
renounced predecessor.”37 Roberts also found that the recent
Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran38 decision had determined
that § 1605(a)(7) was merely a jurisdictional provision affecting no
substantive rights and thus was “not impermissibly retroactive with
respect to pending cases.”39

IV. HOLDING
40

In Beaty v. Iraq the D.C. District Court, though considering the
question prior to the enactment of the NDAA and the subsequent
presidential waiver of Section 1083, ruled that Iraqi sovereignty had
33. Id. at 48 (dismissing the case because under Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
370 F. 3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the claimants needed to state a cause of action under a specific
source of law, such as a state tort law claim).
34. Id. at 51.
35. Id. at 60 (Roberts, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 61.
38. Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that
§ 1605(a)(7) creates no private right of action against the state, therefore requiring plaintiffs to
file claims under a source of law other than § 1605(a)(7)).
39. Acree, 370 F.3d at 65.
40. Beaty v. Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2007).
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41
not been restored by a Presidential waiver under the EWSAA. The
court held that whether the plaintiffs had stated an actionable claim
of relief under § 1605(a)(7) was answered by Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic
42
Republic of Iran, and the plaintiffs re-filed their complaint under
various state tort law claims.43 The court then looked to the language
of § 1605(a)(7) and found the plaintiffs met all the requirements for
44
jurisdiction under that provision.
The district court then had to decide whether—even if the case
was nonjusticiable as preempted by the President’s restoration of
sovereign immunity, as a political question, or as contravening the
45
foreign-affairs preemption or act-of-state doctrines —the court
46
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Before the court could address
the impact of the first Presidential Determination, Determination
2003-23, on the court’s jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Acree v.
Republic of Iraq47 that the EWSAA did not give the President
48
authority to waive § 1605(a)(7) for Iraq. The district court, forced to
uphold Acree, lamented that were it free to reach the question itself, it
would instead follow Judge Roberts’s persuasive argument that the
plain language of the statute did indeed grant presidential authority
to waive § 1605(a)(7).49
In determining whether the case presented a political question,
50
the Court would not permit an end-run around Acree and therefore
dismissed Iraq’s justiciability challenge and other subject matter
jurisdiction challenges.51 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the
D.C. Circuit upheld the decision, saying only that Iraq’s sovereign

41. Id. at 70 (rejecting Iraq’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and that the claims
were nonjusticiable or preempted because of their potential to undermine foreign policy).
42. See Ciccipio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1032 (stating that the FSIA created no private right of
action).
43. Beaty, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 93–99 (finding the state law-based intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim valid).
44. Id. at 69.
45. Id. at 70–90.
46. Id. at 69.
47. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at 48.
49. Beaty, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
50. Id. at 76.
51. Id. at 70–90 (dismissing some claims for which the court lacked jurisdiction due to the
President’s waiver for Iraq and dismissing other claims under political question, foreign-affairs
preemption, and act-of-state doctrines).
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immunity “has not been restored under the Emergency Wartime
52
Supplemental appropriations Act” as held in Acree.
Despite the addition of the NDAA (which expanded the
sovereign immunity exception but explicitly granted Executive power
to exempt Iraq from the new exception) and the President’s
subsequent waiver of the NDAA’s applicability to Iraq, the D.C.
courts continued to find the case justiciable. The D.C. Circuit in Simon
53
v. Iraq addressed whether the NDAA repealed § 1605(a)(7),
removing jurisdiction over Simon’s tort claim, while the presidential
waiver under Section 1083 prevented re-filing under the new §
1605A.54
In analyzing whether the courts retained jurisdiction over the §
1605(a)(7) cases, the D.C. Circuit Court observed the line drawn in
Hamdan and Landgraf between statutes that affect only jurisdiction
and thus are presumed to apply to pending cases, and statutes that
alter substantive rights and thus cannot be applied retroactively
absent clear Congressional intent.55 Rather than determining whether
substantive rights were implicated by the NDAA, the Court instead
found that the language of Section 1083 and the “text and structure of
the NDAA” provided enough guidance for their interpretation.56 The
NDAA’s reference to cases “filed under this section”57 literally meant
those filed under § 1605A, and not the pre-amendment § 1605(a)(7);
likewise the amendment’s application to claims “arising under section
1605A” did not apply to pending claims.58 Additionally, the fact that
the NDAA granted plaintiffs sixty-days—following either the
enactment of the NDAA or the entry of judgment, during which time
their § 1605(a)(7) cases could be re-filed under § 1605A—meant
courts still had jurisdiction to enter judgment on pending cases after
the NDAA’s enactment.59 Furthermore, Acree had already held that
the earlier EWSAA did not authorize the President to suspend §
52. Beaty v. Republic of Iraq, No. 70-7057, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27256 at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 21, 2007).
53. Simon v. Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
54. Id. at 1190.
55. Id. at 1189–91 (overturning the district court’s ruling that the suit was untimely and
refusing to find a non-justiciable question).
56. Id. at 1191.
57. Pub. L. No. 110-81, Section 1083(c)(1) (“The amendments made by this section shall
apply to any claim arising under section 1605A [of this statute] . . . .”).
58. Simon, 529 F.3d at 1191–92.
59. Id. at 1192–93.
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60
1605(a)(7) for Iraq. Combined with the provisions surrounding
Section 1083, the Court found Section 1083(d)(1) merely granted the
President the power to render inapplicable to Iraq those parts of the
NDAA to which he had objected in the bill’s first codification, and
that the NDAA applies only to suits under § 1605A.61

V. ANALYSIS
At the heart of Iraq v. Beaty is a relatively straight-forward
question of statutory construction: whether either the EWSAA or the
NDAA allow the President to render § 1605(a)(7) inapplicable to
Iraq. The Court’s decision, however, could add fuel to either side of
the enduring debate regarding the deference courts give to
Congressional intent and Executive foreign policy determinations.
If the Court upholds Acree v. Republic of Iraq and the lower
courts’ interpretations of the EWSAA and NDAA, then subsequent
courts may find themselves with more leeway to interpret statutes and
Executive determinations in ways which may seem contrary to their
texts. If the Court instead finds that the D.C. Circuit has
misinterpreted the statutes, it would direct the judiciary to give more
deference to the text of foreign-policy-related laws and their
interpretation by the President.
A. Arguments
Beaty, Simon, and the other respondents highlight the reasoning
of the Acree court and the decisions of the D.C. courts below—
collectively holding that neither the EWSAA nor the NDAA granted
the President the authority to restore Iraqi sovereign immunity—to
argue that the text of the EWSAA is ambiguous while that of the
NDAA is not, that Congress did not intend to allow the removal of
jurisdiction initially under the EWSAA and intended to do so only
prospectively under the NDAA, and that there is no real danger of
harming U.S. foreign policy by deciding existing suits.
The text of Section 1503 of the EWSAA must be looked at,
according to Respondents and the Acree court, in light of its context

60. Id. at 1193.
61. Id. at 1194.
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62
and the other provisions around it. In the EWSAA the reference to
the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 “indicates that the section is concerned
with eliminating statutory restrictions on aid and exports needed for
Iraq’s reconstruction, and not with principles of sovereign immunity
or the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.”63 Thus, the Respondents assert that
the provision sought to remove funding obstacles for reconstruction,
and the term “any provision” should be read in light of that purpose—
a purpose that does not encompass jurisdiction.64 The EWSAA’s
context also includes Congress’s intent as demonstrated in Section
1083(c)(4) of the NDAA: “Nothing in section 1503 of the Emergency
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act . . . has ever authorized,
directly or indirectly . . . the removal of the jurisdiction of any court of
65
the United States.” In keeping with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
Respondents also argue that Section 1083 removes jurisdiction
without providing any alternative forum for the suits against Iraq, and
thus, should not be applied to pending cases without express statutory
language to that effect.66 The absence of such language evidences
Congress’s intent that the statute apply only to prospective cases. As
for the damage to reconstruction efforts and the financial stability of
Iraq, alleged by Petitioners to be important foreign policy goals of the
United States, Respondents point out that Section 1083 has no
adverse effect. Respondents argue “[b]luntly: no more claims will ever
be filed against Iraq for the torturing of U.S. soldiers and citizens” and
those cases can be settled for nothing of material significance to
Iraq.67
Petitioners urge the Court to overturn Acree and reverse the
lower courts’ decisions, arguing that the relevant text of the EWSAA
and the NDAA is unambiguous and should be interpreted as such—
that in the realm of foreign affairs the President’s inherent authority

62. Brief in Opposition at 26–27, Republic of Iraq v. Simon, No. 08-539 (U.S. Nov. 24,
2008).
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 27–29.
65. Brief In Opposition at 9–11, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, No. 70-1090 (U.S. Apr. 23,
2008).
66. Id. at 17–19.
67. Id. at 7; see also id. at 10–12 (observing that when the President waived § 1605A for
Iraq as of January 2008, only six or seven cases existed, (including Simon, another case joined
with Simon on appeal and Acree) with likely damages of approximately $1 billion, which is a
financial burden Iraq is able to bear with its “projected . . . budget surplus of nearly $80
billion”).
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should be given deference and that to allow pending suits to proceed
will damage U.S. foreign policy with regard to Iraq.
According to Iraq, the text of EWSAA Section 1503 should be
interpreted broadly. Echoing the words of then-Judge Roberts’s
concurrence in Acree, Petitioners argue that the President’s authority
to waive “any provision” with respect to Iraq be given its plain, broad
68
meaning—”any” means “any”—to include § 1605(a)(7). This
interpretation is consistent with prior decisions giving “any” a broad
reading in the absence of contrary legislative history.69 Thus, unlike the
Acree court’s interpretation of the statute, Petitioners argue that there
is no evidence of legislative intent to limit the provision to purely
financial obstacles for assisting Iraq. The provision’s terms are not
restricted by reference to money but rather by the fact that any laws
the President determines shall no longer apply to Iraq must “‘appl[y]
to countries that have supported terrorism.’ That perfectly describes
former Section 1605(a)(7).”70 Even using the potential motive of
lifting financial burdens, the United States argues that for Iraq,
“Section 1605(a)(7) is a statute that, to use the words of the Acree
majority, ‘present[s] obstacles to funding for the new Iraqi
Government’” because of the potential costs of liability.71 Moreover,
subsequent legislative history cannot be used to interpret a prior act
of Congress, meaning that Section 1083(c)(4) of the NDAA has no
bearing on the effect of the EWSAA.72
Petitioners also argue that Section 1083 of the NDAA should be
read to apply to pending cases. According to their argument, this
section strips jurisdiction, not substantive rights, and thus applies to
pending cases; to say that plaintiffs were left with no alternative
forum incorrectly confuses “Congress’s action in repealing and
replacing former Section 1605(a)(7)” (the new § 1605A encompassing
every case cognizable under the original), “with the President’s action

68. Brief for Petitioners at 23, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, Nos. 07-1090 & 08-539 (U.S. Feb.
19, 2009) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
69. Id. at 23–24 (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2008) and
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980)).
70. Id. at 25.
71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Iraq v. Beaty, Nos. 07-1090 & 08539 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2008) (recommending the Court grant certiorari) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for
the United States].
72. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 35; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, Republic of
Iraq v. Beaty, No. 70-1090 (U.S. May 5, 2008).
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73
in waiving [this] replacement.” Unlike the statutory provisions in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Petitioners argue this is not a case of several
provisions explicitly applying to pending cases while the relevant
74
provision makes no mention of such application. The provision’s text
contains no explicit language contrary to “the usual rule that
jurisdictional repealers apply to pending cases.”75 The Respondents’
claims are thus included in the President’s restoration of Iraqi
sovereignty and are no longer justiciable.
In addition to the statutes, Petitioners argue the President has
inherent authority “to compromise the claims of U.S. nationals to
76
further foreign policy interests.” Executive authority should be given
broad deference regarding foreign policy because of the difficulty of
77
anticipating the Executive’s foreign policy needs. Here both Section
1503 of the EWSAA and Section 1083 of the NDAA were interpreted
by the President, but the D.C. courts “erred in failing to accord any
deference to his construction of that provision.”78

B. Disposition
To understand how the current Court is likely to resolve the
question of whether Iraq’s immunity has been restored for cases
pending when the EWSAA and NDAA were enacted, it is crucial to
look at the three approaches taken in recent cases regarding
retroactive application of statutes.
Justice Scalia reiterated his famous disdain for referring to
legislative history in Landgraf v. USI Film Products precisely because
it “converts the ‘clear statement’ rule into a ‘discernible legislative
intent’ rule,” and undermines the plain meaning of the text.79 When

73. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10, Republic of Iraq v. Simon, No. 08-539 (U.S. Dec. 10,
2008).
74. Id. at 11.
75. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 42.
76. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, No. 70-1090 (U.S. Feb.
19, 2008).
77. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 30.
78. Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 71, at 15; see also Petitioner’s Brief, supra
note 68, at 34, 52 (arguing that the failure to accord deference to the President’s interpretations
and to allow the suits to continue directly jeopardizes U.S. foreign policy by financially
burdening reconstruction and by risking similar suits against American forces in Iraq).
79. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 287 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (finding the statute non-retroactive because of the absence of a clear textual
statement to indicate that it should be retroactive).
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determining the retroactive application of a statute in the face of
ambiguous text, he focuses on the nature of the activity covered by
the statute, emphasizing the language of the statute as the foundation
of this inquiry. If the statute deals with primary conduct, the term
Scalia uses to refer to “substantive rights,” the presumption is against
retroactive application. If the statute is merely procedural, i.e.
jurisdictional, it is presumptively retroactive because the “plain
import of a statute repealing jurisdiction is to eliminate” jurisdiction
over pending cases too.80 In fact, “applying a jurisdiction-eliminating
statute . . . to prevent any judicial action” after the statute’s enactment
is not retroactive application at all, as it does not affect any
substantive rights.81
In joining Justice Scalia’s Hamdan dissent, Justice Alito appears to
agree with Scalia’s overall approach. Though Justice Roberts has not
participated in the Court’s prior cases dealing with the retroactive
application of jurisdictional statutes,82 his dissent in Acree placed an
emphasis on the plain meaning of the EWSAA’s text similar to
Scalia’s approach, finding that because the EWSAA provision was
merely jurisdictional it could be presumed to apply retroactively.83
Though he joined Justice Scalia’s Landgraf concurrence, Justice
Kennedy’s approach differs. Agreeing that the text is always the
starting point for statutory interpretation, Justice Kennedy finds an
even stronger presumption for non-retroactive application in the
absence of a clear congressional statement. In addition to following
the substantive rights/jurisdiction divide set out in Landgraf, Justice
Kennedy distinguishes between provisions that confer jurisdiction and
those that strip the courts of jurisdiction: the presumption against
retroactivity still applies for the creation of jurisdiction and is only
84
vanquished by jurisdiction-ousting statutes. For his Republic of
Austria v. Altmann opinion this presumption proved dispositive
80. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 657–65 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
the majority ignored the President’s interpreting the statute to apply to pending cases).
81. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 294; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 703
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the FSIA limits jurisdiction in U.S. courts only, and
thus may affect substantive rights only incidentally by denying viable alternative forums).
82. Justice Roberts did not participate in the Hamdan, Landgraf or Altmann decisions.
83. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F. 3d. 41, 60–65 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
84. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 722–23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320, 342–43, n.3 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting)).
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because he found the FSIA to be ambiguous and therefore subject to
85
the presumption against retroactivity. In determining whether the
statute is clear regarding application to pending cases, Justice
Kennedy takes issue with the implication in Altmann that deference
be given to Executive statements despite their potential to undermine
the intent of Congress.86
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinions, in which Justice
Ginsburg joined, for Hamdan, Landgraf, and Altmann. Like Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, he began his statutory interpretation with the
text. When the text proved unclear, however, Justice Stevens
demonstrated a willingness to move beyond the provision’s text to its
context and the nature of the rights at stake. Most importantly, he
looked to the surrounding legislative history. In Justice Stevens’s
analysis, a statute’s context appears to include related Executive
commentary. So in Altmann he expressed concern with the political
nature of the FSIA, noting that while the Court did not address the
issue of the political question doctrine87 it nonetheless ought to defer
to the political branches’ determinations regarding the wisdom of the
88
courts taking jurisdiction in a case. Justice Stevens also relied on the
accepted distinction between substantive statutes, which are
presumed to be non-retroactive, and jurisdictional provisions, which
are applicable to pending cases.
Both the Acree v. Republic of Iraq and Simon v. Republic of Iraq
decisions ostensibly rested on the language of the EWSAA and the
NDAA, finding no need to determine whether the authority granted
to the President removed substantive or jurisdictional rights. In its
own interpretation, however, the court in Acree seemed to follow the
approach of Justice Stevens in giving a contextual and purposive
89
reading to what might otherwise be clear statutory language. Thus
“any provision” came to mean any provision aimed at the purpose of
90
eliminating financial obstacles. In contrast, the Simon decision made
a Justice Scalia-like refusal to move beyond the pure text of the
85. Id. at 721–23.
86. Id. at 735–36.
87. Id. at 689.
88. Id. at 696.
89. See discussion supra Part III.
90. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J, concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing his interpretation of “any” to mean “any,”
without the context added to the word by the majority).
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NDAA, finding instead that the clear statutory language applied only
91
prospectively to cases filed under § 1605A.
The real battle will likely be over whether the text of either the
EWSAA or the NDAA is ambiguous. It seems that Justice Scalia will
agree with Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation in Acree that the
EWSAA is an unambiguously broad grant of power to the President.
Despite Justice Stevens’s willingness to consider the statute’s purpose
and legislative history, demonstrated in Acree, he has also been
skeptical of questioning Executive interpretations of foreign affairs
92
statutes and the FSIA specifically. Justice Stevens may very well
decline to counter the President’s interpretation of the EWSAA’s
scope. And Justice Kennedy has the opposite inclination, as he is
skeptical of deferring to Executive statements, which may run counter
to Congressional intent.
The crucial holding will then be the application of either the
EWSAA (if its clear language so authorized the President to waive
the § 1605(a)(7) exception of sovereign immunity for Iraq) or the
NDAA (if the EWSAA did not grant the President authority to waive
§ 1605(a)(7) for Iraq) to pending cases. If the Court determines that
the statutes have no clear statement on retroactivity, and must
therefore determine whether the EWSAA and NDAA are
jurisdictional or substantive, it appears the lower courts’ decisions will
be overturned. Unlike the FSIA, which the Court has confusingly
found to be both jurisdictional and substantive,93 a waiver for Iraq by
the President under either Section 1503 of the EWSAA or Section
1083(d) of the NDAA only removes the ability of a state or federal
court to hear a case, and is therefore purely jurisdictional. Under the
approaches of both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia, joined in their
various opinions94 by the other justices, save Kennedy, if the statute is
jurisdictional there is no presumption against retroactive application
where, as here, there is no clear statement to the contrary. Even
Justice Kennedy, with his greater wariness of retroactive application,

91. See discussion supra Part IV.
92. See id. at 689–96 (noting the importance of grace and commity in foreign affairs, and
deferring to State Department policy, practice, and statements).
93. Id. at 695 (dealing with the FSIA as an act that created jurisdiction).
94. Again, looking at their opinions in Hamdan, Landgraf and Altmann.
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has said that statutes removing jurisdiction are not subject to the
95
presumption against their application to pending cases.
The EWSAA provision does not have clear language addressing
its application to cases pending when it was enacted, and thus if the
Court holds that the President had authority to waive the exception
for Iraq, it will probably find this to be a waiver of pure jurisdiction—
not involving substantive rights (Scalia’s “primary conduct”)—that
applies retroactively.
If the Court does not read the EWSAA to permit the Presidential
waiver of § 1605(a)(7), it will then have to address the somewhat
more difficult language of the NDAA with regard to retroactivity. The
D.C. Circuit held in Simon that the language of Section 1083 was clear
enough that its application to cases “arising under” and “filed under”
its newly created provisions could be read literally to apply only to
96
prospective claims filed after the NDAA’s enactment. The
Petitioners argue that this language is not explicit enough to
overcome the presumption for retroactive application for jurisdictionrepealing statutes.97
Yet this argument ignores the structure of the analysis undertaken
in all three Justices’ approaches: competing presumptions of
retroactivity and non-retroactivity do not come into play until after
the text has been determined to be ambiguous. Legislative history and
Executive interpretation are only considered if the text is ambiguous.
In light of the deference given to a statute’s text by all Justices, and
particularly Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, it seems likely
that the Court will construe the NDAA’s language as demonstrating
Congress’s intent that the President’s waiver for Iraq not apply to
pending cases. Again, though, the determination of the EWSAA’s
applicability will probably render this moot.98
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court seems likely to hold that Section 1503 of the EWSAA
provision authorized the President to waive the FSIA’s § 1605(a)(7)
exception to sovereign immunity with regard to Iraq, and in so doing

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 722–23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1191–92 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 42.
See discussion supra Part V(B).
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that Section 1503 rendered the cases pending at the time of the
EWSAA’s enactment—including Acree v. Republic of Iraq, Beaty v.
Republic of Iraq, and Simon v. Republic of Iraq—nonjusticiable. This
ruling would combine the purely textual analysis favored by Justice
Scalia with Justice Stevens’s more purposive and deferential
approach, looking to Congress and the Executive to shine light on the
statute’s scope and leave only Justice Kennedy dissatisfied. But in
applying the EWSAA to pending cases, even Justice Kennedy is likely
to concur that a jurisdiction-stripping provision, as in the EWSAA’s
Section 1503, presumably applies retroactively without a clear
statement to the contrary. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit’s holdings will
probably be overturned, and the cases against Iraq ruled
nonjusticiable.

